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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Tony Brown appealed against his sentences and asserted that, during the
sentencing hearing, the district court impermissibly compelled him to make incriminatory
statements after he invoked his right to remain silent. He had waived that right during
the change of plea hearing so the district court could ensure that his plea was valid, and
he had provided all the information the district court needed at that time. Therefore,
Mr. Brown's limited waiver of his right to remain silent did not extend to the sentencing
hearing or the information sought by the district court. Furthermore, his invocation also
functioned as an objection to the district court's inquiry, thus eliminating the need for
fundamental error analysis (even though all three prongs of that test are present in this
record). Because of that invocation (which, contrary to the State's assertion, was clear),
any attempt to elicit further statements by the district court violated Mr. Brown's rights.
In regard to the sentence the district court ultimately imposed (relying on its
disbelief of the compelled statement, proving Mr. Brown's concerns about speaking to
be true), the district court abused its discretion by impermissibly restricting its discretion,
as it decided that there are some crimes, which, by their nature (like aggravated
battery), cannot have any result but incarceration.
None of the State's arguments against these positions are compelling, and thus,
this Court should grant Mr. Brown the requested relief.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Brown's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Brown's state and federal constitutional
rights to be free from self-incrimination by compelling him to make a statement
during the sentencing hearing.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified
sentence of fifteen years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Brown following his plea
of guilty to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Violated Mr. Brown's State And Federal Constitutional Rights To Be
Free From Self-Incrimination By Compelling Him To Make A Statement During The
Sentencing Hearing

A

Introduction
Mr. Brown had federal constitutional, state constitutional, and state statutory

rights to remain silent. 1 (See App. Br., p.8.) He offered a limited waiver of those rights
to the district court when he decided to plead guilty. That waiver was limited to only
those facts necessary for the district court to establish that his plea was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary, and that it had a factual basis. Because the charged offense
(aggravated battery) does not have a mens rea component, his motive was not a
relevant fact of the crime.

Thus, that waiver never extended to that information.

Regardless, once the district court assured itself of the validity of the plea and accepted
it as such, the purpose of the waiver had been completed, and therefore, the waiver
ceased to function. As such, it did not extend to the sentencing hearing.
Therefore, once Mr. Brown invoked his right to remain silent at the sentencing
hearing, any attempt by the district court to compel him to speak violated his state and
federal rights to remain silent. That invocation also served as an objection to the district
court's attempts to compel him to speak, thus eliminating the need for this Court to

1

It should be noted that the statutory protection may extend the privilege against selfincrimination beyond the scope of the constitutional protections. State v. Heffern, 130
Idaho 946, 949 (Ct. App. 1997) (examining I.C. § 19-3003). However, even under the
minimum scope of the constitutional protections, the district court's actions violated
Mr. Brown's rights.
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engage in any fundamental error analysis (although Mr. Brown could meet all three
prongs of that analysis if he had needed to). The issue was preserved for appeal and
this Court has the power to decide the issue on its merits.
Furthermore, Mr. Brown was clear about his reason for wanting to remain silent:
he was concerned that the district court would not believe his statements. The obvious
conclusion from that observation is that he feared harsher sentencing if he made a
statement that the district court did not believe or it believed he was trying to avoid
accepting responsibility (a significant mitigating factor in this case). Both those fears
were not just plausible, but were actualized by the district court when, after compelling
his statements, it imposed an excessive sentence. Therefore, the district court's efforts
to compel Mr. Brown to speak despite a valid invocation of his rights to remain silent
were error, and as such, this Court should vacate the sentence and remand for
sentencing before a new judge.

B.

This Court Need Not Engage In A Fundamental Error Analysis, As Mr. Brown's
Invocation Of His Right To Remain Silent Functions As An Objection To The
District Court's Inquiry
As the Idaho Supreme Court pointed out in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010),

the purpose of requiring objections at trial is to give the district court the opportunity to
consider and resolve the issues, as it is in a better position to resolve such errors at
trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224. In this case for example, by stating: "I don't want to talk
about it," Mr. Brown was objecting to the district court's attempt to compel his statement
in regard to his motives.

(4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.11.)

The district court

considered and resolved that issue: "No. I think that's part of it. I think you need to talk
about it. It's part of the responsibility." (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.12-14.) The same is true
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with all Mr. Brown's invocations. He articulated that he wished to act in accordance with
his right to remain silent and the district court's efforts to compel him to speak served to
resolve the question of whether it believed he could invoke those rights. 2 Therefore, the
issue was preserved for appeal, and all Mr. Brown need demonstrate is that the district
court's actions were contrary to the law. See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190,
194-95 (1955) (recognizing that an objection in such a scenario can function as an
invocation of the rights to remain silent for fear of self incrimination). 3 Mr. Brown will
demonstrate the error of the district court's actions in detail in Section l(C), infra.
Assuming, arguendo, that the invocation did not preserve the issue for appeal,
the three elements of the Perry fundamental error test are present, and thus, this Court
may still decide the merits of the issue. As will be discussed in Section l(C), infra, the
limited waiver of those rights effectuated by Mr. Brown's guilty plea did not waive those
rights for the sentencing hearing.

Therefore, Mr. Brown is asserting the violation of

unwaived state and federal constitutional rights. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
The violation is clear from the record (see 4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.17,
p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.3), as "[a]ny effort by the State to compel respondent to testify
c1gainst his will at the sentencing hearing clearly would violate the Fifth Amendment."
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (emphasis added). For example, the district

2

As will be discussed in detail infra, Mr. Brown was able to invoke those rights at the
sentencing hearing.
3
If an objection also serves as an invocation, the inverse - that an invocation also
serves as an objection - should also be true. See Emspak, 349 U.S. at 194-95. The
point the Emspak Court was making is that when this right is invoked, it functions as a
challenge to continued questioning by the State. See id. at 194-201. As a challenge to
continued inquiry, particularly when the State runs roughshod over that invocation, the
invocation should necessarily preserve the issue for appeal. See id.; Perry, 150 Idaho
at 224.
6

court, in response to one of Mr. Brown's invocations, told Mr. Brown: "No. I think that's
part of it. I think you need to talk about it. It's part of the responsibility." (4/25/11 Tr.,
p.24, Ls.12-14 (emphasis added).)

It is hard to imc1gine a more clear statement

compelling testimony from a defendant at a sentencing hearing, meeting this prong of
the Perry test. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Nevertheless, the State attempts to argue
that Mr. Brown's invocation was somehow ineffective.

The State contends that

Mr. Brown's statements are insufficient because he did not reference the Fifth
Amendment or indicate that he thought the statements would be incriminating.
(Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) Its arguments are meritless and contrary to precedent on both
counts.
As to the need to actually reference the Fifth Amendment, that argument is
erroneous because, as has been well established in precedent, all the person need do
to invoke those rights is make a statement which can be reasonably believed to be an
attempt at invocation, not some ritualistic statement. Emspak, 349 U.S. at 194; McGraw

v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2001 ).
unequivocal, the right will be invoked.

Therefore, where the request is

See, e.g., State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,

559 (2008). In determining that a defendant had not unequivocally invoked the right to
remain silent, the Payne Court looked at the defendant's use of the phrases "I think" and
"maybe I should" as being indicative of the equivocal nature of his attempted invocation.

Id.; see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994) (looking to the use
of the term "maybe" to indicate an insufficient invocation and emphasizing the
conclusion that the request might be an invocation leads to a conclusion of
insufficiency); Arnold v. Runnels, 421 F.3d 859, 865-66 (9th Cir. 2005) (looking at the
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use of the terms "might" and "maybe" as indicating the equivocal nature of the
statements).
Contrarily, Mr. Brown's statements were unequivocal. (4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.25 p.24, L.2, p.24, Ls.8, 10-11, p.31, Ls.22-23.) For example, in response to the question
"Mr. Brown, anything you want to say?" Mr. Brown answered, "No." (4/25/11 Tr., p.23,
L.25 - p.24, L.2.) He did not add any words like "maybe" or "might." Compare Emspak,
349 U.S. at 197 (finding that, in light of the colloquy between the panel and the
declarant, the answer "no" was unequivocal). 4 Mr. Brown just said, very plainly and
unequivocally, "no," indicating that he did not want to make any statement to the district
court. (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, L.2.)
His other invocations were similarly unequivocal: "I don't want to speak .... I
don't want to talk about it. ... I don't want to say anything else." (4/25/11 Tr., p.24,
Ls.8, 10-11, p.31, Ls.22-23.) Those statements are nearly identical to those considered
by the Sixth Circuit in McGraw, which were found to unequivocally invoke the right to
remain silent. McGraw, 257 F.3d at 515, 518-20 (holding that statements such as
"I don't wanna talk about it" could only reasonably construed as invocations of the right
to remain silent). As such, Mr. Brown's statements were sufficient to invoke his right to
remain silent, even though he never mentioned the Fifth Amendment. Emspak, 349
U.S. at 194; see Payne, 146 Idaho at 559.

4

In fact, the well-established rule is that the courts "must 'indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights."' Emspak, 349 U.S. at
198 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). In this case, that rule and
the context of Mr. Brown's response indicate that his invocation was unequivocal.
See id.
8

As to the need for an articulation that he believed the statements wou Id be
incriminating (Resp. Br., pp.14-15), Mr. Brown provided a sufficient indication of that
belief through his multitude of assertions that the district court would not believe his
statements.

(See, e.g., 4/25/11 Tr., p.28, Ls.18-19; p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.1.)

That

assertion established the fear of incrimination based on the Hobson's dilemma it
created, as articulated by the Court of Appeals in State v. Heffern:
In essence, the court's method of inquiry into the BB gun incident left
[Mr.] Heffern with the Hobson's choice of (1) asserting his innocence while
risking a harsher sentence if the trial judge didn't believe him,
(2) remaining silent and risking a harsher sentence, or (3) admitting guilt
and still risking a harsher sentence.
Heffern, 130 Idaho 946, 950 (Ct. App. 1997).

As demonstrated by this scenario,

Mr. Brown had articulated a fear that his statements would not be believed, and
inferentially, would be incriminating Uust as option 1 in Heffem's Hobson's dilemma is
incriminating). Therefore, the record clearly and sufficiently demonstrates Mr. Brown's
valid invocation of his rights to remain silent.
Since Mr. Brown's invocation was effective, the district court's efforts to compel
him to speak (for example, "No. I think that's part of it. I think you need to talk about it.
It's part of the responsibility." (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.12-14)), violated those invoked
rights. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 463. And since that error is plain from the statements made,
as recorded in the transcripts, the violation is clear from the record, satisfying the
second Perry prong. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
Finally, that violation of Mr. Brown's rights affected the outcome of the
_ proceedings. Mr. Brown had a legitimate fear that, if he responded to the district court's
questions, the district court would not believe him (indicating a concern that the district
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court would find that he was unwilling to accept responsibility for his actions, and thus,
increase his punishment). 5 Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999) (the
defendant may have a legitimate fear that further statements may lead to adverse
consequences when the sentence has not yet been imposed); State v. Anderson, 130
Idaho 765, 769-70 (Ct. App. 1997) (where the defendant is compelled to testify or risk
having his silence be construed as an aggravating factor, such compelled statements
violate the right to remain silent); Heffern, 130 Idaho at 950 (a defendant may have a
legitimate fear of adverse consequences where the district court's method of inquiry

5

The district court's expressions of disbelief are all clearly erroneous, given the
evidence in the record. The district stated that it believed the other explanations of
Mr. Brown's actions, even though he told the district court that he had not told anyone
else of his motivations. (See, e.g., 4/25/11 Tr., p.24, L.15 - p.26, L.16, p.28, Ls.18-22,
p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.1.) As such, all those other explanations were merely speculations
made by other witnesses and, thus, were unreliable as explanations of Mr. Brown's
actions, particularly when he consistently offered his own explanation. (2/28/11 Tr.,
p.11, Ls.14-16; PSI, p.5; 4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-17, p.32, Ls.9-10.) The police reports
actually corroborate Mr. Brown's statements in this regard. (See App. Br., p.5 for a
complete breakdown to which motivations each of the witnesses was speculating.)
As they are merely speculations, those statements do not disprove Mr. Brown's
consistent explanation of his own actions. For example, the district court asserted that
Mr. Brown's girlfriend did not corroborate his story, implying that this discredited his
account. (Resp. Br., pp.8, 13; 4/25/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.8-16; see also PSI, p.8 (identifying
Wendy Payne as Mr. Brown's girlfriend); PSI, p.4 (reporting Ms. Payne's speculation as
to Mr. Brown's motive as revenge against Mr. Wilson for giving an STD to one of their
friend's girlfriends).) However, as Mr. Brown explained, his girlfriend could not have
corroborated his account, since she had been unaware of the threat in the first place.
(4/25/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.8-16; see also PSI, p.5 (according to Mr. Brown, "[n]one of them
knew why I had the intention.")) Regardless, just because Ms. Payne was unaware of
the threat (and thus, unable to corroborate it without committing perjury) does not mean
that the threat did not actually occur or that Mr. Brown's conclusion that it was a
legitimate threat was unfounded, or that the threat was the reason for his actions.
As such, the district court's expressions of disbelief are clearly erroneous, and
the State's assertions and arguments in this regard (see Resp. Br., pp.2-3, 8, 13) are
similarly unpersuasive because they are subject to this same logical fallacy.
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includes disbelief of the defendant's statements and thus, the defendant risks harsher
punishment by speaking).
Mr. Brown's fear was actualized by the district court's sentencing determination,
as it departed from its stated approach to sentencing offenders like Mr. Brown
(preferring not to incarcerate youthful offenders and those without significant records),
and imposed the maximum prison term allowed by statute. (Compare 4/25/11 Tr., p.37,
Ls.5-21, p.38, Ls.14-15, p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.3 with 4/25/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.9-12; see also
App. Br., pp.5-6.)

As such, the violation affected the outcome of the proceedings,

leading to a more severe sentence, and thus, meeting the final prong of the Perry test.
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.

As such, even if Mr. Brown did not preserve the issue by invoking his rights, this
Court is still able to consider the issue as fundamental error. See id.

C.

The District Court's Questions Were Impermissible, Compelling Mr. Brown To
Speak In Violation Of His Invoked State And Federal Constitutional Rights

1. The United States Supreme Court Has Held That The Limited Waiver Of
These Rights Does Not Permit Continued Inquiry To The Facts Of The
Offense During The Sentencing Hearing
The defendant's right to silence applies during both the guilt and sentencing
phases of a case. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462; State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 218 (1994).
When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he necessarily, although limitedly, waives that
right. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217. The
purpose of that waiver is to allow the sentencing court to ensure that the defendant's
plea is valid (i.e., that it is knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and that there is a factual
basis for it).

Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 322; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217-18.
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The State

attempts to take these protections and turn them back against the defendant, arguing
that if he provides that limited waiver, the courts are allowed to continue to compel
information from him.

(Resp. Br., pp.7-10.) This argument flies in the face of clear

United States Supreme Court precedent, which admonishes that:
The purpose of a plea colloquy is to protect the defendant from an
unintelligent or involuntary plea. The Government would turn this
constitutional shield into a prosecutorial sword by having the defendant
relinquish all rights against compelled self-incrimination upon entry of a
guilty plea, including the right to remain silent at sentencing.
There is no convincing reason why the narrow inquiry at the plea
colloquy should entail such an extensive waiver of the privilege.
Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added).

Rather, as the United States Supreme

Court reaffirmed in Mitchell, the privilege against self incrimination at sentencing is
paramount and the State's perspective that the waiver allows for continued questioning
as to the facts of the offense is inappropriate. Id. at 324.

In fact, the United States

Supreme Court recounted its discussion of this very question during the oral argument
in Mitchell:
At oral argument, we asked counsel for the United States whether,
on the facts of this case, if the Government had no reliable evidence of the
amount of drugs involved, the prosecutor "could say, well, we can't prove
it, but we'd like to put her on the stand and cross-examine her and see if
we can't get her to admit it." Counsel answered: "[T]he waiver analysis
that we have put forward suggests that at least as to the facts
surrounding the conspiracy to which she admitted, the Government
could do that." ... Were we to accept the Government's position, ...
[t]he result would be to enlist the defendant as an instrument in his
or her own condemnation, undermining the long tradition and vital
principle that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by
the Government, not on inquisitions conducted to enhance its own
prosecutorial power.
We reject the position that either petitioner's guilty plea or her
statements at the plea colloquy functioned as a waiver of her right to
remain silent at sentencing.

12

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Since the United States Supreme Court has
already considered and flatly rejected the argument the State seeks to make in this
case, this Court also must reject it. 6 Therefore, since Mr. Brown had the right to remain
silent at the sentencing hearing, the district court's efforts to compel him to speak
violated those rights.
This rule does not create the paradox between Wilkins and I.C.R. Rule 11
because the State's premise for the paradox is fundamentally flawed. (See, Resp. Br.,
p.10.) The State presumes that the district court is able to question the defendant about
the underlying facts of the case at sentencing, but, as Mitchell clearly held, the district
court has no such authority. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 324.
Furthermore, the State's paradox is premised on the idea that the district court
has not determined whether the plea was valid prior to the sentencing hearing. (See
Resp. Br., p.10.) That, too, is erroneous, as the defendant enters his plea and then the
district court determines whether the plea is valid before it accepts it at the change of
plea hearing.

(See 2/28/11 Tr., p.3, Ls.7-19 (wherein the district court recited the

elements of the offense and then asked "How do you plead?" to which Mr. Brown
responded "Guilty"); p.14, Ls.13-16 (wherein, after the plea colloquy which complied
with I.C.R. Rule 11, the district court declared, "[w]ill accept that plea [of guilty] as
having been freely, voluntarily, knowingly entered, a violation of Idaho Code 18-903,
18-907, aggravated battery").) Therefore, the perspective that Mr. Brown's arguments

6

To the extent that Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218 (decided in 1994), State v. Jones, 129
Idaho 471, 475 (Ct. App. 1996), and Heffern, 130 Idaho at 950, infra note 1 (decided in
1997), are in conflict with Mitchell (which was decided in 1999), they should be
considered abrogated on that point by the controlling precedent set forth in Mitchell, 526
Idaho at 322. (See Resp. Br., pp.7-10.)
13

would prevent the district court from complying with I.C.R. Rule 11 is but a figment of
the State's imagination. The determination of whether the plea is valid is made at the
change of plea hearing and need not be rehashed at the sentencing hearing.
Therefore, there is no reason for the waiver to extend beyond the change of plea
hearing, other than to allow the State to violate defendants' rights to be free from selfincrimination. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 323-24 (recognizing that the sentencing court
took care to adhere to the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11
(the federal counterpart to I.C.R. Rule 11) before accepting the guilty plea, thus
eliminating the need to extend the limited waiver to the sentencing hearing).

2. Even If The District Court Were Permitted To Inquire Into The Facts
Underlying The Charge At Sentencing, Its Questions Sought Information
Beyond The Scope Of Any Such Waiver
Assuming, arguendo, that the limited waiver of the rights to remain silent extends
to the sentencing hearing only for inquiry into the facts of the offense, the district court's
questions are still impermissible. First and foremost, the waiver of a constitutional right,
such as the right to remain silent, is never presumed.

Glengary-Gamlin Protective

Ass'n, Inc. v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 90 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Emspak, 349 U.S. 190).

In fact, the State bears the burden to show a clear waiver:

'"Although the privilege

against self-incrimination must be claimed, when claimed it is guaranteed by
the Constitution. . . . Waiver of constitutional rights ... is not lightly to be inferred.
A witness cannot properly be held after claim to have waived his privilege ... upon
vague and uncertain evidence."' Emspak, 349 U.S. at 196 (quoting Smith v. United
States, 337 U.S. 137, 150) (ellipses in original). Therefore, the State had to show an

affirmative waiver of that right before the district court's attempt to compel statements.
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See Emspak, 349 U.S. at 196; Glengary-Gamlin; 106 Idaho at 90. To that end, when a
defendant pleads guilty, that action only affirmatively demonstrates a limited waiver
which only extends to the facts of the underlying charge. See, e.g., Mitchell, 526 U.S. at
324; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218. As such, if the statements at issue do not fall within the
limited waiver and the State fails to demonstrate any other clear waiver in the record,
the district court is not permitted to compel the defendant to make those statements.
See, e.g., Emspak, 349 U.S. at 196; Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 324; Glengary-Gamlin; 106
Idaho at 90; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218.
The record in this case only clearly demonstrates that Mr. Brown proffered the
limited waiver as to the underlying charge of aggravated battery. The facts pertinent to
a charge of aggravated battery are set forth in I.C. § 18-903 and I.C. § 18-907 (see R.,
pp.40-41 ): a battery is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person
of another" and it is aggravated if the defendant, while committing a battery, "causes
great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement; or uses a deadly
weapon or instrument." 7 As is evident from the statutes, there is no mens rea element
necessary for a person to commit a battery or an aggravated battery. Rather, it is a
general intent crime - as long as the defendant unlawfully and willfully strikes his target
with a deadly weapon or causes great bodily harm, he is guilty of aggravated battery,

7

There are three different phrasings of the action necessary to constitute a battery.
See I.C. § 18-903. In the charging document, the State essentially used the first of
these phrasings, although it borrowed part of the language from the second phrasing,
specifically "actual, intentional and unlawful," as opposed to "willful and unlawful."
(R., pp.40-41.) Regardless of the phrasing, the facts necessary to prove that element of
the crime are the same. See, e.g., State v. Billings, 137 Idaho 827, 829-30 (Ct. App.
2002). Similarly, aggravated battery has multiple phrasings. See I.C. § 18-907. The
State chose to charge Mr. Brown pursuant to §§ 18-907(a) and (b) as alternatives to
one another. (R., pp.40-41.)
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regardless of his motives at the time he strikes the victim. See, e.g., State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 400 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 370, 375 (Ct. App. 2003).
As such, Mr. Brown's motives were irrelevant to the inquiry into the facts of the charged
offense. Id. Therefore, the motive was beyond the scope of his limited waiver as it did
not constitute a fact necessary to the underlying offense. See, e.g., Mitchell, 526 U.S.
at 324; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218.
The district court made a significant inquiry into the facts of this charge at the
change of plea hearing. Such an inquiry was necessary to make sure that Mr. Brown
understood this very distinction - that it did not matter who he intended to hit, just
that he intended to hit the person he had targeted that night. (See 2/28/11 Tr., p.12,
L. 7 - p.13, L.18.) Ultimately, Mr. Brown admitted to all the facts necessary to establish a
factual basis for the plea: that he willfully and unlawfully struck another person with a
deadly weapon (a baseball bat).

(2/28/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.14-18.)

The limited waiver

extended no further than these elements of the crime. See, e.g., Mitchell, 526 U.S. at
324; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218. As such, the district court's inquiry into those matters
violated Mr. Brown's constitutional rights. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462; Wilkins, 125 Idaho
at 218.
In fact, the Idaho appellate courts have consistently construed such waivers
narrowly, vacating sentences obtained when the inquiries have exceeded the scope of
such waivers.

See, e.g., Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217-18 (vacating the defendant's

sentence upon finding that, wbile statements made by the defendant to ~1is psychiatrist
and to his parents related to the defendant's charged offense, inquiry to those
statements exceeded the scope of his limited waiver effected by his guilty plea, as those
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statements were unnecessary to demonstrate the validity of his plea); Heffern, 130
Idaho at 949-50 (vacating the defendant's sentence upon finding that the defendant's
limited waiver effected by his guilty plea did not extend to facts of another incident, even
though the defendant had been granted immunity from prosecution for that other
incident).
Similarly, the Idaho appellate courts have only allowed such inquiries where the
defendant's waiver was not limited, unlike Mr. Brown's limited waiver. See, e.g., State
v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 297 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding that, where the defendant did not

invoke his right during the PSI investigation nor object to the inclusion of such
statements when they were first considered, the protection to those statements is
waived and the defendant cannot later rely on the protections to preclude consideration
of those statements at some later time) 8 ; State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 49 (1972)
(finding that the defendant's act of taking the stand to offer testimony constitutes a

8

The critical difference between this case and Person, demonstrating why Person is not
controlling precedent, is that the defendant in Person was trying to go back and invoke
the protection for statements he had already made, and redact those statements from
the PSI report. See Person, 145 Idaho at 297-98. Contrarily, Mr. Brown invoked the
privilege so as not to make any new statements. (See 4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24,
L.17, p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.3.) He was not seeking to redact any of his statements from
his PSI report. (See 4/25/11 Tr., p.4, L.25 - p.5, L.22 (Mr. Brown's only challenge to the
information included in the PSI was in regard to a typographical error in his parents'
telephone number).) He just did not desire to make any further statement because the
district court was determined to not believe him. (See, e.g., 4/25/11 Tr., p.28, Ls.18-19,
p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.1.) As such, the State's attempted reliance on Person is misplaced
and does not undermine Mr. Brown's arguments. (See Resp. Br., pp.16-17.) The fact
that he had already made such statements did not waive his rights, as those statements
were irrelevant to the purpose of the waiver, and thus beyond the scope of the waiver.
See, e.g., Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 324; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218.
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waiver of the right against self incrimination unless the defendant expressly re-invokes
that right). 9
Therefore, the State's arguments are meritless and contrary to established
United States Supreme Court precedent, as well as Idaho precedent. As a result, they
do not undermine Mr. Brown's arguments, which demonstrate the district court's
violation of his invoked rights to remain silent.

Because of this violation, this Court

should vacate Mr. Brown's sentence and remand the case for new sentencing before a
new judge.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen
Years, With Four Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Brown Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Aggravated Battery With A Deadly Weapon
The State's arguments in this regard are mostly unremarkable, and thus, no
further reply is necessary.

To that end, Mr. Brown simply refers the Court back to

pages 16-28 of his Appellant's Brief.
However, there is one point which the State makes which does merit a response,
that being its analysis of the holding from State v. lzaguire, 145 Idaho 820, 824-25
(Ct. App. 2008).

The rule from lzaguire is that it is inappropriate, and an abuse of

discretion, for a district court to establish "undue, self-imposed restriction[s] upon the

9

As with Person, Jesser is distinguishable and, thus, not controlling since Mr. Brown
had not sought to offer testimony. See Jesser, 95 Idaho at 49. In fact, that is exactly
what he was trying not to do by saying "I don't want to speak," et al. (See 4/25/11 Tr.,
p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.17, p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.3.) As such, the State's attempted reliance
on Jesser is misplaced and does not undermine Mr. Brown's arguments. (See Resp.
Br., p.14) Those statements were still irrelevant to the purpose of the waiver, and thus
beyond the scope of the waiver. See, e.g., Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 324; Wilkins, 125 Idaho
at 218.
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district court's exercise of its sentencing discretion."

Id.

In that case, the Court of

Appeals referenced one of the district court's statements as an example of one such
undue restriction:
For example, the court explained that it rejected the recommended twentyfive-year determinate term because "I also think that twenty-five years
fixed for the murder, not the accidental killing, but the murder of a human
being is too little." This appears to be stated as a general principle that
twenty-five years is an inadequate fixed term for any murder.
Id. at 824. Such a self-imposed limitation of discretion led the Izaguirre Court to vacate

that sentence and remand for further proceedings. Id. at 825.
As in lzaguire, the district court in this case implied that it will not consider
probation or retained jurisdiction in aggravated batteries: "sometimes people do things
in life that there's no alternative but the penitentiary because of the nature of the crime."
(4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.22-24 (emphasis added).) The parallels between this statement
and that which was criticized in lzaguire are striking: both point out that they believe the
permissible, more lenient sentencing option is improper; both base that determination
on the district court's perspective of the crime committed; and both imply the district
court would similarly restrict sentencing alternatives in similar future cases. As such,
both are impermissible restrictions on the district court's sentencing discretion.
The fact that the district court made several references to the specific facts of this
case is not relevant.

(See Resp. Br., pp.20-21.)

The issue, as the lzaguire Court

pointed out, is whether the district court extended its sentencing perspective from those
facts to other potential cases.

See lzaguire, 145 Idaho at 824 ("This appears to be

stated as a general principle .... "). Therefore, the fact that the district court in this case
did discuss the specific facts is irrelevant to whether it violated the rule from lzaguire,
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which it did by stating that, because of the nature of the crime (aggravated battery),
"there's no alternative but the penitentiary .... " (4/25/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.22-24.) This
statement clearly indicates that this district court would similarly restrict its discretion in
similar future cases. Therefore, as in lzaguire, the district court in this case abused its
discretion, and this Court should remedy that abuse.

CONCLUSION
Because the district court violated Mr. Brown's state and federal constitutional
rights to be free from self-incrimination, Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his sentence and remand this case for new sentencing before a new judge.
Otherwise, because the district court abused its discretion and imposed an
excessive sentence, Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded
to the district court for a new sentencing hearing
DATED this 13th day of June, 2012.

~A:~

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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